I enjoyed writing that as the title to this piece and hopefully the choice of title will become clear as you read through. It was fun trying to think up a colourful title to a piece about the dull topic of swap discounting and how the "greeks", more commonly found when describing options, have made an appearance into the discussion on swap discounting.
Other titles that made the shortlist but didn't win through in the end included:
· "Cross
gamma risk hits swap mark-to-market". Discarded for being too geeky.
· "Who
is gamma and why is she cross with LDI?" Discarded for potentially being construed
as gender biased.
· "What
do you get when you cross "gamma" with "LDI"? Discarded
for being too cheesy.
In the last few months I have heard a few people mention cross-gamma risk and how this is impacting swaps transacted as
part of an LDI strategy. And so I thought what better way to spend a Saturday
night than with a glass of white wine, a bowl of popcorn and writing about why
your swaps have cross-gamma risk. Oh, and no harm having the snooker on in the background since it's looking like the Rocket is in fine form at the Crucible.
(1) Simple folk like me need simple explanations....especially after the first glass of wine.
Many of you will be familiar with the concepts of duration and convexity and how they apply to bonds. Duration (or more specifically modified duration), we are told, is a handy measure for calculating by how much the value of your bond will increase in response to a 1% fall in yields. Of course, we are then told that, unfortunately, this handy rule of thumb works best for small changes in yield and that for larger changes in yield the actual change in the value of your bond will be different to that implied by the bond's duration. This is because it turns out that duration, far from being a single static number, is actually a dynamic number and one that will be different depending on the level of prevailing yields. And so, to our first rule of thumb we must add a second rule of thumb:
- as yields increase, duration decreases
- as yields decrease, duration increases
[In technical terms, this relationship means that bonds are convex, and, more specifically, positively convex.]
(2) I swear they do this just to confuse me.....mind you,
not too difficult a task after the second glass of wine.
So, just when I thought I had all that mastered, along come the
market practitioners and confuse me by susbtituing the terms duration and
convexity with terminology often used in option markets. And so, duration and
convexity, become interchangeable with delta and gamma respectively! Recall
that the delta of an option (or derivative) is change in the value of the
option with respect to a change in the value of the underlying asset on which
the option is based. Gamma is then the change in the delta of the option with
respect to a change in the value of the underlying asset.
And so the "delta" (duration) of a bond or a swap
becomes the change in the value of the bond/swap with respect to a change in
interest rates. The "gamma" (convexity) of the bond or swap is then
the change in the delta (duration) with respect to a change in interest rates. Delta is also generally referred to as "PV01" - the change in the present value of a swap or bond for a one basis point change in yield.
(3) And then along comes cross gamma...boy this aint
going to be easy, especially after the third glass of wine.
So by now I'm just about managing to keep all of this
straight in my head, and keep my head vertical after my 3rd glass of di vino
bianco (white wine), when along comes cross gamma. [Btw, I am
practising my Italian in advance of my trip to Amalfi in a few weeks. So far I
know how to ask for a glass of wine and beer - sorted, I say, although the kids may not think so especially seeing as how we plan to hire a car and word has it that the roads are quite treacherous.].
In the world of options, cross gamma arises when the delta of your option (or
derivative) changes in response to changes in, not one, but two (or more)
underlying assets. Cross gamma is then the change in the option delta with
respect to a change in the value of the second asset.
Not so fast, I hear you say, an interest rate swap is surely just based on a single interest rate and so how on earth does it acquire cross gamma risk.
Well, it turns out that the plain old interest rate swap has become a little more complex than we had all previously thought. In particular, when valuing the interest rate swap, it is possible for the future floating rate payments on the interest rate swap to be forecast or estimated using one interest rate and for these same future payments to be discounted back to the present time using a completely different interest rate. When this happens, then your plain old interest rate swap acquires "cross gamma risk". Cross gamma refers to the change in the delta of the swap in response to a change in the (different) interest rate being used to discount your swap.
(4) Going back to basics ...better hold off on the next
round, this may require a measure of sobriety.
Many LDI strategies hold interest
rate swaps executed against 3-month Sterling LIBOR - so receive a fixed rate of
interest and pay floating-rate 3-month Sterling LIBOR.
(4.1) Estimating/projecting the cashflows on these swaps
The future fixed payments are obviously known since these were fixed at execution of the swap, say 4% p.a.. At any point during the lifetime of the swap, the projected future floating rate (LIBOR) payments are unknown since future 3-month Sterling LIBOR fixings are unknown. These future, unknown payments can be estimated using our estimates of future 3-month LIBOR fixings (as implied by a 3-month "LIBOR interest rate curve"). This is the first of the "interest rates" we encounter.
The future fixed payments are obviously known since these were fixed at execution of the swap, say 4% p.a.. At any point during the lifetime of the swap, the projected future floating rate (LIBOR) payments are unknown since future 3-month Sterling LIBOR fixings are unknown. These future, unknown payments can be estimated using our estimates of future 3-month LIBOR fixings (as implied by a 3-month "LIBOR interest rate curve"). This is the first of the "interest rates" we encounter.
(4.2) Valuing our swap cashflows
To value the swap we now need to
discount both streams of cashflows (the fixed cashflows and the floating
cashflows) back to the present time. The discount rate used depends on the type
of collateral backing this swap(1) (A statement which assumes a
massive amount of knowledge but see the additional note at the bottom of this piece for a more detailed explanation of why this is the case).
(4.3) Choosing a discount curve
If, the collateral is "Sterling cash and gilts only", then the swap is likely to be discounted using an interest rate curve derived from SONIA interest rates (a "SONIA interest rate curve") - and this is the second interest rate curve.
If, the collateral is "Sterling cash and gilts only", then the swap is likely to be discounted using an interest rate curve derived from SONIA interest rates (a "SONIA interest rate curve") - and this is the second interest rate curve.
(4.4) Impact of choice of discount curve
So, cross gamma risk arises.
Cross-gamma risk refers to the fact that the delta of our (3-month LIBOR) interest rate
swap will change due to changes in the SONIA interest rate curve i.e. a second,
and different, interest rate curve to the one on which the future floating rate
payments are based (LIBOR). There are some important observations that need to
be highlighted at this point even if they may appear obvious at first reading:
a)
Swap values now
depend on two interest rate curves
These two interest rate curves are LIBOR (for
projecting future cashflows) and SONIA (for discounting those cashflows).
A corollary of this is that the swap value
therefore also depends on the difference between these two interest rate
curves.
A word of caution. One common mistake made by many, including less experienced practitioners, is to look at the
difference between spot 3-month LIBOR and spot SONIA rates and conclude that it
is this difference that influences our swap valuation. But, because LDI
strategies typically execute long-dated interest rate swaps, the difference
that matters is found by instead looking at the difference in fixed rates on LIBOR swaps and SONIA swaps at maturities
similar to those of the swaps we hold. All else equal, the larger the difference in these fixed rates, the larger the impact
from SONIA discounting on the value of our swap. This difference is referred to as the LIBOR-SONIA
basis. LIBOR-SONIA "basis swaps" are a separately traded instrument and market and connect the LIBOR swap market
with the SONIA swap market. So assuming all discounting was done using the
SONIA curve because we had a “cash and gilts” CSA then we could write:
- Fixed rate on a 30-year 3-month LIBOR swap = Fixed rate on a 30-year SONIA swap plus market level on a 30-year LIBOR-SONIA basis swap.
b)
LIBOR swaps with
SONIA discounting have an embedded LIBOR-SONIA basis swap
It follows from what we said in a) above that, long-dated LIBOR swaps discounted at SONIA, embed a long-dated LIBOR-SONIA basis swap. This means
that whenever a LIBOR swap is transacted on a "cash and gilts" CSA then the scheme is also
asking the bank to transact a LIBOR-SONIA basis swap. The same applies to swap
unwinds and recouponing transactions. We return to this later.
c)
The SONIA curve can
rise or fall even if there is no change in the LIBOR curve
Apologies if this is stating the obvious.
Intuitively,
we should expect that a SONIA interest rate curve representing the cost of
unsecured overnight borrowing should correlate well with a (3-month) LIBOR interest rate
curve representing the cost of unsecured, 3-month borrowing. So that
movements in one should mimic movements in the other.
Of course, we now know
that during a credit (or more aptly, a liquidity) squeeze, the ensuing panic
can create massive uncertainty, even over a short period like 3-months and so
3-month unsecured borrowing rates (LIBOR) can become unhinged from their
overnight counterpart, SONIA. The extent of this "unhinging" or
dislocation may be largest at shorter-maturities but can often be seen in
longer maturities too, i.e. the “LIBOR-SONIA basis” can be large at both short
and longer-dated maturities. When this unhinging occurs at longer maturities it
will impact the value of LIBOR swaps discounted at SONIA, if these swaps have a non-zero mark-to-market.
d)
The delta of our
swap changes
Moving to SONIA discounting changes the delta
of our swaps. The impact has parallels with the impact that convexity has on duration, so that all else
being equal then:
-
lower SONIA rates (relative to LIBOR rates) increases the
delta of our swap and swap values become even more sensitive to changes in
interest rates and
- higher SONIA rates
(relative to LIBOR rates) decreases the delta of our swap and swap values
become less sensitive to changes in interest rates.
(Again, remember what we said earlier about
drawing a distinction between differences in spot LIBOR-SONIA rates versus differences in long-term LIBOR
and SONIA rates or the long-term LIBOR-SONIA basis. It is the latter that matters for LDI clients who typically hold long-dated interest rate swaps against 3-month LIBOR).
(5) Show me the money. Oh, and a final glass for the road.
Putting it all together then the financial impact on
the pension fund can be summarised as follows:
- Increased delta (or PV01) on migration to “cash and gilts” CSAs
In a world
where the SONIA interest rate curve lies below the LIBOR curve (as it does
presently), then cross gamma risk means that a LIBOR swap discounted at SONIA
has a higher delta. As yields fall, this delta increases even further.
For clients
migrating to SONIA CSA’s from LIBOR CSA’s, the higher deltas arising on the
switch to SONIA discounting means that the scheme is effectively adding PV01
(perhaps inadvertently). Schemes and their advisers should take account of this
change in PV01 and adjust their hedges appropriately.
Of course swaps may be unwound to
reduce the unwanted PV01/delta but caution should be exercised (see point 3
below).
- Delta (or PV01) charges for migrating to “cash and gilts” CSAs
A bank’s trading desk will see
these higher deltas as a risk to be hedged and hence an additional transaction
for which the end-user (the pension scheme) must be charged. On large swap portfolios the additional PV01 is not insignificant and the charges not trivial. Caveat emptor.
- Opportunity costs from inadvertent positions in the LIBOR-SONIA basis
The value (or mark-to-market) of
LIBOR swaps discounted at SONIA changes as the LIBOR-SONIA basis changes.
For LDI
strategies, pension funds are typically receiving fixed rates on long-dated (LIBOR) interest
rate swaps so that:
i) If the swaps are in-the-money to the pension scheme then the in-the-moneyness of these LIBOR swaps will increase when the
long-dated LIBOR-SONIA basis widens and decrease when it tightens.
ii) If the swaps are out-of-the-money to the pension scheme then the out-of-the-moneyness of these LIBOR swaps will increase when the long-dated LIBOR-SONIA basis widens and decrease when it tightens. Looked at from the pension scheme's perspective, for out-of-the-money swaps, the pension scheme is hoping that the LIBOR-SONIA basis tightens because that will mean the out-of-the-moneyness of the swaps will decrease resulting in a smaller out-of-the-money position.
iii) If the swaps have no mark-to-market then the changes in the LIBOR-SONIA basis do not affect the value of the swap.
Choosing to
unwind or recoupon existing swaps crystallises the LIBOR-SONIA basis at levels prevailing
at the time of the unwind. The long-dated LIBOR-SONIA basis is prone to distortion especially in times
of crisis. Even though the impact is most felt at shorter-maturities, the impact at longer maturities is significant and should not be underestimated.
In much the
same way that schemes are alive to other distortions - for example with regard
to swap spreads - schemes and their advisers should be alive to the possibility
of distortions in the LIBOR-SONIA basis.
If a pension scheme's swaps are in-the-money and the basis is unusually narrow at
the time of the unwind or recoupon then, arguably the scheme could be losing out from
potential future gains should the basis mean revert to its historically wider
level. For example, at various times in the last 12 months the forward LIBOR-SONIA basis has been very narrow due to a lack of liquidity in the forward basis swap market. Clients recouponing in-the-money swaps or unwinding their positions would have been locking into this narrow basis and therefore losing out on the potential to benefit from a subsequent widening out of this forward LIBOR-SONIA basis.
I am not for a moment suggesting running unwanted interest rate risk
simply because the basis is unfavourable but rather suggesting that were the
basis considered to be unfavourable then perhaps there are other ways to reduce
interest rate risk and these should be considered first - for example
targeting unwinds at maturities where the basis is considered more attractive or shortening the duration of any bonds held either physically or on repo .
- Basis swap charges on unwinds and recoupons
- Each time a LIBOR swap (on SONIA discounting) is executed or restructured then a charge will be made by the bank for the corresponding basis swap position being (inadvertently?) carried out. These charges will be higher if the bank is not well positioned to for the risk it is being asked to take on.
In summary, cross gamma risk is alive and prevalent in your LDI strategy. Make sure you understand the consequences of transactions executed and work to minimise slippage in your LDI implementation. All done and just in time too, the wine's almost up and its the final frame of this session. Tweet
Notes:
(1) It is not my purpose here to go into the nuances of what an appropriate interest rate curve is to use for the purposes of discounting. This is covered by many others in a form and depth far better than I ever could. Here is a link to one of the better, albeit more technical, descriptions out there.
If you find that some of the text in the document below appears corrupted then clicking on "Fullscreen" should rectify this.
2 comments:
The question that comes to mind from reading your post is why should a pension fund use LIBOR based swaps at all in its LDI hedges? Surely SONIA based swaps would eliminate this complex "cross gamma" effect?
In a nutshell, and in my view, it is only a matter of time.
The size of the Sterling interest rate swap market and the breadth of usage across different end-users means that time is needed for this market to rewire itself to work off SONIA rather than LIBOR. As this rewiring occurs, we should expect liquidity to improve in long-dated SONIA swaps, which are currently illiquid with higher bid-offers. The start of this will be the interbank market (banks hedging between themselves)where increasing volumes of LIBOR-SONIA basis swaps and SONIA swaps should be a catalyst for improved liquidity.
In my view, pension funds should be using current opportunities to transact at (historically) attractive levels and convert at least a portion of their hedging portfolio into SONIA swaps and then fully push for SONIA swaps once liquidity has improved sufficiently.
Obviously, the management of SONIA swaps requires systems to be updated and so, in some cases, time is needed to re-plumb systems to cope with these instruments.
To the extent that benchmarked (active) mandates are sophisticated enough to capture slippage from this source then there should be greater impetus to move to SONIA swaps but even here, the comments about liqudity may mean there is likely to be some reluctance and discomfort from being the first to move.
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